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Interprovincial Sovereign Immunity Revisited
Abstract
The conventional wisdom has been that the Canadian provincial Crowns are immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of other Canadian provinces just as they are immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. This
reflects the old views that the provinces are like foreign countries for the purposes of the conflict of laws and
that court jurisdiction over the Crown is purely a creature of statute. Recent recognition of the constitutional
bases for court jurisdiction and the need to reassess conflict of laws rules in light of the principles of Canadian
federalism invites us to revisit interprovincial sovereign immunity, especially as it could arise in multi-province
class actions against the Crowns in right of the provinces.




The conventional wisdom has been that the Canadian
provincial Crowns are immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of other Canadian provinces just as they are
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. This
reflects the old views that the provinces are like foreign
countries for the purposes of the conflict of laws and
that court jurisdiction over the Crown is purely a
creature of statute. Recent recognition of the
constitutional bases for court jurisdiction and the need
to reassess conflict of laws rules in light of the
principles of Canadian federalism invites us to revisit
interprovincial sovereign immunity, especially as it
could arise in multi-province class actions against the
Crowns in right of the provinces.
La philosophic traditionnelle est a l'effet que
l'immunit6 des Couronnes provinciales s'6tend aux
tribunaux des autres provinces canadiennes. Cela
refl6te les anciens principes scions lesquels les
provinces peuvent 6tre assimiles A des pays 6trangers
pour les fins de conflit des lois et que la juridiction du
tribunal sur la Couronne est tout simplement une
fiction de la loi. La reconnaissance du fondement
constitutionnel de la juridiction des tribunaux ainsi que
la n6eessit6 de rdexaminer les ragles de conflits des lois
face aux principes du fedralisme canadien, nous
invitent As r66valuer l'immunit6 de la souverainet6
provinciale puisqu'il existe toujours la possibilit6 d'un
recours collectif multi-provincial contre les Couronnes
provinciales.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada boldly proclaimed in
Hunt v. T&N PLC that "the traditional conflicts rules, which were
designed for an anarchic world that emphasized forum independence,
must be assessed in light of the principles of our constitutional law."l
The Court in Hunt developed the principle enunciated in its 1990
decision in Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye2 that the relationship
between the superior courts of the provinces should reflect and foster
Canadian federalism. In part, this required that the provincial superior
courts recognize that they are obliged in various contexts to cooperate
even more closely with one another than with the courts of other
countries.
Still, when the decision in Hunt was released, it was difficult to
anticipate the extent of the reform that might follow or its likely
direction or progress. Since then, academics have speculated on the
implications of the decision for such diverse matters as proof of foreign
law and constitutional review of regulations governing court jurisdiction 3
but, as yet, the legacy of Hunt has sounded in few specific doctrinal or
legislative developments.
In the coming years, however, it appears likely that the decision
in Hunt will form the basis for reconsidering, among other things, the
view that the provincial governments are immune from the jurisdiction
of the superior courts of the other provinces. While the question of
interprovincial Crown immunity has largely eluded judicial scrutiny, the
emerging phenomenon of multi-province class proceedings is likely to
necessitate its authoritative resolution. Should it happen that, for
example, in the area of fisheries management or health care delivery, the
provincial governments had been involved jointly or similarly in
regulating resources improperly, or in providing the public with goods or
services that proved injurious, it would be necessary to resolve whether
their liability could be determined in a single proceeding or whether they
would have to be sued in separate proceedings in the courts of each
province.
Apart from the practical impetus to resolve the question, a
determinination of the provincial Crowns' amenability to suit in the
1 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 at 321 [hereinafter Hunt].
2 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 [hereinafterMorguard].
3 See, for example, E. Edinger, "The Constitutionalization of the Conflict of Laws" (1995) 25
Can. Bus. LJ. 38.
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courts of other provinces would clarify whether this traditional aspect of
"sovereignty" forms part of the relationship between the Canadian
provinces. Some might regard provincial sovereignty as obviously
antithetical to federalism, but this would seem to be a peculiarly
Canadian view. American federalism, for example, clearly contemplates
the accommodation of some state sovereignty, including the immunity of
state governments from the jurisdiction of federal courts.4 Accordingly,
a consideration of interprovincial Crown immunity could shed light on a
subtle but important feature of the Canadian constitutional structure.
II. THE NOTION OF INTERPROVINCIAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
While the prevailing academic view was once that the provinces
are separate sovereigns for the purposes of court jurisdiction, the
jurisprudence has been divided. In its 1967 decision in Weir v. Lohr,5 the
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench held that the private international
law rule against enforcing foreign revenue laws did not preclude a claim
for a hospital account for which the plaintiff had been reimbursed by the
Saskatchewan government because "[iun Manitoba the Province of
Saskatchewan is not to be regarded as a foreign state. Her Majesty in
right of the province of Saskatchewan is not a foreign sovereign in Her
Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench for Manitoba." 6 The issue before the
court was one of the application of another province's laws and not of
local court jurisdiction over other provincial governments. Still, Weir
provides an early articulation of the distinction in court jurisdiction
between foreign sovereigns and other provincial Crowns and suggests
that interprovincial Crown liability should be governed by the same
principles as domestic Crown liability. 7
This approach was later endorsed by the Quebec Court of
Appeal when it recognized that the law of interprovincial Crown liability
should be based on principles of Crown liability and not on those of
sovereign immunity in Quebec (Commission Hydroilectrique) v. Churchill
4 See U.S. Const. amend. XI; and L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2d ed. (New York;
Foundation Press, 1988) at 173-89.
5 (1967), 62 W.W.R. 99 (Man. Q.B.) [hereinafter Weir].
6 Ibid. at 106.
7 The comparable distinction on the international plane is that between the doctrines of the
exclusion of foreign law and sovereign immunity.
1997]
OSGOODEHALL LAW JOURNAL [ VOL. 35 No. 2
Falls (Labrador) Corp.8 The Crown in right of Newfoundland objected
to being impleaded in the courts of Quebec but Monet J.A. held:
[J]e suis d'avis qu'iI ne faut pas confondre les r~gles de droit international en matire
d'immunit--que la jurisprudence de nos Tribunaux reconnait-et le principe de la
souverainet6 des provinces canadiennes dans le champ de comp6tence qui est le
leur-que la jurisprudence de nos Tribunaux a consacr6 depuis longtemps. Sans ignore
que la chose effectivement jugfe 6tait tout autre dans l'affaire Weir c. Lohr, je n'hfsiterais
pas h transposer ici l'opinion de monsieur le juge en chef Tritschler.9
This was not, however, the approach taken in early academic
consideration of the subject. Professor Dale Gibson criticized the
decision in Weir. He offered the following analysis, suggesting that the
provinces are separate sovereigns for the purposes of court jurisdiction:
Suppose an employee of the British Columbia government drives to Alberta in the course
of his duties, and negligently injures someone in a collision while in Alberta. If the
injured person sues the British Columbia Crown in British Columbia, he will probably not
succeed, since by British Columbia law the Crown is not liable in tort. If he sues in
Alberta, where the Crown is liable in tort, he will probably meet a similar fate under
existing law, because of the principle that the courts will not entertain an action against a
foreign' sovereign.10
In the footnote to the above passage, Gibson observed:
It is arguable that the Crown in the right of another province is not a foreign sovereign,
but I suspect that it would be so treated for this purpose. It is true, however, that one
province has been held not to be a foreign state in the courts of another for the purpose
of the rule that the courts of one state will not enforce the tax laws of another: Weir v.
Lohr. ... In any event, the provincial legislation imposing tort liability is usually so
phrased as to apply to the Crown of that province only.11
It was on this basis that the British Columbia Supreme Court in
Western Surety Co. v. Elk Valley Logging Ltd. held that "Alberta is a
sovereign state vis-.-vis the Province of British Columbia"1 2 and,
therefore, was entitled to immunity from the process of the British
8 [1980] C.A. 203.
9 Ibid. at 209. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court explicitly refrained from
addressing this question and decided the case on other grounds: [1982] 2 S.C.R. 79 at 91. The
Quebec Court of Appeal later reiterated with approval the observation of Monet J.A. in Sparling v.
Caisse de Dipot [1985] C.A. 164, affd [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1015, but, as in Weir, supra note 5, the issue in
Spading was that of Crown immunity from the application of another province's statute and not
immunity from the process of its court.
10 D. Gibson, "Intejurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism" (1969) 47 Can. Bar Rev.
40 at 59 [emphasis added].
11 Ibi. n. 69.
12 (1985), 23 D.LR. (4th) 464 at 468 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter Western Surety].
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Columbia courts. The court regarded the comments in Weir to be obiter
dicta as the case concerned Crown immunity from another province's
legislation and not the jurisdiction of its courts. Instead, the court relied
on the analysis of the English Court of Appeal in Mellenger v. New
Brunswick Development Corp.13
Although Mellenger is one of very few decisions to address the
sovereign immunity of a province, reliance on it, in the context of
interprovincial Crown immunity, seems misplaced. In Mellenger, a claim
of sovereign immunity from the English courts by a provincial Crown
corporation had been challenged on the basis that a provincial Crown
was not a foreign sovereign. The issue might have arisen because the
entitlement to immunity of sub-federal governments like the Canadian
provincial governments might not have been obvious to the English
courts: in a unitary state such as the United Kingdom, the second tier of
government would be local or municipal in nature and not entitled to be
treated as a sovereign. Having considered the nature and structure of
the provincial government, the Court of Appeal held that "[e]ach
provincial government, within its own sphere, retained its independence
and autonomy, directly under the Crown. ... It follows-that the Province
of New Brunswick is a sovereign state in its own right, and entitled, if it
so wishes, to claim sovereign immunity.1 4 The operative question here,
however, is whether the Province of New Brunswick is sovereign in the
sense that the governments of Canada are sovereign vis- -vis foreign
governments and courts or whether the provincial government is
sovereign in the sense that it is a separate sovereignty vis-A-vis other
Canadian provinces and superior courts. By adopting this reasoning in
Western Surety, the British Columbia Supreme Court appeared to
assimilate the question of sovereign immunity that was addressed in
Mellenger (i.e., whether New Brunswick, as one of the Canadian
governments, was entitled to immunity from foreign courts) to the
question of Crown liability (i.e., whether the Crown in right of New
Brunswick was amenable to suit in the Canadian superior courts).
Since then, Western Surety has been followed by other courtsl5
13 [1971] 2 All E.R. 593 [hereinafter Mellenger].
14 Ibid. at 595-96.
15 Bouchard v.J.L. Le Saux (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 792 at 797-99 (S.C.), rev'd on other grounds
(1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 799 (H.C.J.), rev'd on other grounds (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 124 (C.A.). The
"historic principle of sovereign immunity" was cited by Wilson J. as an additional reason for
declining jurisdiction in Godin v. New Brunswick Electric Power Commission (1993), 16 C.P.C. (3d)
388 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [hereinafter Godin]. See also Dableh v. Ontario Hydro (1993), 33 C.P.R.
(3d) 544 (F.C.T.D.). However, in Dableh, it was noted, at 549, that the court in question, the
Federal Court, was a statutory court and that there could be a different result for a court of inherent
1997]
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and the academic commentary has continued to note it as a precedent in
the area; 16 and in the most recent edition of Liability of the Crown
Professor Peter Hogg, relying in part on Western Surety and the Gibson
article,17 answered the jurisdictional question in the negative: "[c]an the
Crown in right of Ontario be sued in the courts of British Columbia? ...
Although there is not much direct authority on the point, in principle the
answer must be no."18
III. JURISDICTION OVER CROWN PROCEEDINGS AT
COMMON LAW AND PURSUANT TO STATUTE
While Professor Hogg reached the same conclusion as the court
in Western Surety, it appears that he did so not on the basis of
interprovincial sovereignty, but rather on the basis that jurisdiction over
the Crown is entirely a creature of statute and only a statute explicitly
granting jurisdiction to the courts of other provinces could render a
.provincial Crown amenable to suit in other provinces.) 9 The
development of Crown liability law until recent years supports the view
that the right to commence proceedings against the Crown is provided
for exhaustively in provincial statutes. Many of those statutes nominate
only the province's own superior courts (and, where they still exist, the
district or county courts) as the courts of competent jurisdiction.
Until some fifty years ago, there was no common law right to sue
the Crown without its consent.20 As Professor Hogg notes, although
"[tihe general rule is that the Crown cannot be sued in any court ..., [t]he
common law can be changed by statute, so that the Crown can be sued in
jurisdiction.
16 See, for example, H. Kindred et aL, eds., International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied
in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1993).
17 Supra note 10.
18 P.W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 267.
19 Similar views were expressed in Legal Education Society of Alberta, Proceedings Involving
Governments (Edmonton: Legal Education Society of Alberta, 1989) at 89: "a province cannot be
sued anywhere but in the Courts of the province in question;" and see Continuing Legal Education
Society of British Columbia, Taking the Government to Court (Vancouver: Continuing Legal
Education Society of British Columbia, 1990) at 4.2.03: "[g]enerally, it is not possible to sue the
Crown in right of one province in the courts of another."
2 0 Supra note 10 at 3-9; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Liability of the Crown
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 8-10; E.C.S. Wade & A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative
Law, 11th ed. (London: Longman, 1993) at 733-36; and S.W.A. de Smith & R. Brazier,
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 6th ed. (London: Penguin, 1990) at 133-34, 626ff., esp. at
630.
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a court that has been granted jurisdiction over the Crown by statute."21
In 1950, following post-war legislative reform in the United Kingdom,
the Canadian Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Legislation prepared a "Uniform Model Act" for Crown proceedings 2 2
Provincial legislation, based on the Model Act, was passed in all the
provinces in the period between 1951 and 197423 with the exception of
Quebec, where legislative provisions granting a right of action against
the government were already in place. 24
Crown liability legislation in the Canadian provinces is fairly
uniform. However, in interpreting the provisions of the various acts, it
should be noted that, owing to the territorial restrictions on provincial
legislation, the relevant statute is that of the defendant province and not
of the forum province.25 Thus, it would appear that a right of action in
the Ontario Court (General Division) against, say, the Crown in right of
Alberta could be authorized only by a provision in the Alberta statute
21 Supra note 18 at 266 (footnotes omitted). However, the common law tradition of immunity,
based on the feudal principle that "a lord could not be sued in his own court," ibid. at 3-4, had long
been recognized to be at odds with the principle of the rule of law and had been restricted by
mechanisms for obtaining the Crown's consent to be sued, such as the petition of right.
22 Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, Proceedings of 1950
(Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1950) at 76 [hereinafter ModelAct].
23 See Alberta: Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-18 [hereinafter Alberta
Act]; British Columbia: Crown Proceeding Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 89 [hereinafter British Columbia
Act]; Manitoba: Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. P140 [hereinafter Manitoba Act];
New Brunswick: Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. P-18 [hereinafter New
Brunswick Act]; Newfoundland: Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N. 1990, c. P-26 [hereinafter
Newfoundland Act]; Nova Scotia: Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 360
[hereinafter Nova Scotia Act]; Ontario: Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27
[hereinafter Ontario Act]; Prince Edward Island: Crown Proceeding Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-32
[hereinafter PEI Act]; and Saskatchewan: The Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.S. 1978, c.
P-27 [hereinafter Saskatchewan Act].
24 R.S.Q. c. C-5, ss. 94-94.10 [hereinafter QuebecAct].
25 A grant of jurisdiction over another provincial Crown would appear to exceed the "within
the province" territorial restriction on legislation that the provinces are authorized to enact
pursuant to section 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 [hereinafter
Constitution Act, 1867]. See Hogg, supra note 18 at 267; and Phillips (Guardian ad litem of) v. Beary
(1994), 29 C.P.C. (3d) 258 (B.C.S.C.); but see Gibson, supra note 10 at 59, who, asks "[c]ould the
Alberta legislature constitutionally pass a statute stating that the Crown in right of other provinces
may be sued in Alberta courts with respect to acts done in Alberta, and held legally liable to the
same extent as the Alberta Crown?" and answers, at 60-61:
It is probable, then, although the question seems never to have been litigated, that
provincial Crowns have no constitutional immunity against the statutes of sister provinces
in which they may be operating. If Manitoba chooses to pass a statute enabling the
Crowns of other provinces to be sued for tort with respect to activities carried on in
Manitoba, it may constitutionally do so. And this, I submit, is as it should be.
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that permitted proceedings in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench and
in other provincial superior courts. The Ontario court could not rely on
an Ontario statute for jurisdiction over the Crown in right of Alberta. It
is important, then, to consider the drafting of each provincial statute to
determine whether it subjects that province's Crown to the jurisdiction
of another province's courts.
Although eight of the provincial statutes provide explicitly for
jurisdiction, the Ontario Act and Quebec Act do not have provisions for
jurisdiction per se. In those Acts, broadly worded provisions for
procedure appear to apply also to jurisdiction and to render the Crown
in right of Ontario and the Government of Quebec, respectively, subject
to the general law governing court jurisdiction.2 6 The Alberta legislation
contains a provision for jurisdiction27 that does not appear to restrict the
jurisdiction of any court that would, under the general law, be competent
to entertain a proceeding against the Crown. It would appear, then, that
the Crown proceedings statutes in Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta contain
no impediment to suit in another province against their respective
Crowns.
The legislation of the other seven provinces, however, contains
jurisdiction provisions adopted from the Model Act that permit
proceedings in local superior courts (and, in some cases, the district or
county courts) pursuant to the relevant legislation (and, in some cases,
the relevant regulations). By permitting or requiring proceedings to be
brought in these courts, the Acts could be regarded as implicitly
excluding proceedings in other courts. This follows from the expressio
unius principle of statutory interpretation by which the designation of
certain courts would impliedly exclude other courts,28 and from the
26 Section 13 of the Ontario Act, supra note 23, provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this Act, in a proceeding against the Crown the rights of the parties are as nearly as possible the
same as in a suit between persons ... ;" and article 94 of the Quebec Act, supra note 24, provides:
"[a]ny person having a recourse to exercise against the government may exercise it in the same
manner as if it were a recourse against a person of full age and capacity, subject only to the
provisions of this chapter."
27 Section 8 of theAlberta Act, supra note 23 provides: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
Act, all proceedings against the Crown in any court shall be instituted and proceeded with in
accordance with the relevant law governing the practice in that court." [emphasis added] The
section was drafted to replace two previous sections (similar to those found in the Saskatchewan Act,
supra note 23) as a result of the consolidation of the former "Supreme" and "District" courts into
the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench. See Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 285, ss.
7, 8; and Court of Queen's Bench Act, S.A. 1978, c. 51.
28 See F.A.R. Bennion, Statutory Interpretation:A Code, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992)
at 874-75.
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absence of common law jurisdiction over the Crown.2 9 Provisions
abolishing previous means of proceeding against the Crown, in the
statutes of Saskatchewan,3 0 New Brunswick,3 1 and Newfoundland 32
appear to support this. In a 1993 decision, the Ontario Court (General
Division) declined to hear an action against the New Brunswick Electric
Power Commission on the basis that the jurisdiction provision of the
New Brunswick Act had to be read in conjunction with section 21 of the
Act which provided "[n]o proceeding may be brought against the Crown
except as provided by this Act."3 3 While the jurisdiction provisions
could have the effect of establishing exclusive jurisdiction in the
province's own courts, the territorial limitations on the grant of
legislative authority of the provinces under section 92 of the Constitution
Act, 186734 would appear to prevent this from being a matter of
legislative intent. Just as it would be ultra vires for a provincial statute to
purport to establish jurisdiction for its courts over another provincial
Crown, so too would it be ultra vires for a provincial statute to purport to
limit the authority of another province's courts. Accordingly, to the
extent that proceedings against the Crown continue to be purely a
creature of statute, the absence of a clear grant of jurisdiction might
have the effect of precluding jurisdiction, even though such a legislative
intent would be ultra vires.
Did legislators intend to exclude the jurisdiction of other
provincial superior courts? The provisions of the seven provinces that
appear to have the potential for restricting jurisdiction to local superior
courts were drawn from the ModelAct which, in turn, was drawn from
the United Kingdom legislation.35 In a unitary state such as the United
29 The British Columbia, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia Acts, supra note 23,
nominate generically "the Supreme Court" or "the Court of Queen's Bench." The Manitoba,
Newfoundland, and Prince Edward Island Acts, supra note 23, nominate specifically the superior
court of the province (/., the Court of Queen's Bench of Manitoba, etc.). Whether the court of
competent jurisdiction is named or not probably does not change the effect of the provision in that
the provisions specifying "the court" arguably refer to the local superior court.
3 0 Saskatchewan Act, supra note 23, s. 23.
31 New Brunswick Act, supra note 23, s. 21.
32 Newfoundland Act, supra note 23, s. 27.
33 Godin, supra note 15.
34 Supra note 25.
35 Section 7 of the ModelAct, supra note 22, cites the United Kingdom Crown Proceedings
legislation as its source: "Subject to this Act, all proceedings against the Crown in (His Majesty's
Court of King's Bench for Manitoba) shall be instituted and proceeded with in accordance with the
King's Bench Act" (U.K.),10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 44, s. 13.
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Kingdom, the "other courts" whose jurisdiction would be excluded by
such a provision would be inferior courts or foreign courts-not courts
of coordinate jurisdiction, like the superior courts of other provinces,
that would exist in a federation. Indeed, Canadian provincial legislators
might have intended only to exclude the jurisdiction of inferior courts in
adopting this provision. In provinces such as Saskatchewan, New
Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, where the district or county court system
still operated at the time this legislation was adopted, provisions were
added to ensure that those courts would also have jurisdiction to
entertain proceedings against the Crown. 36 The New Brunswick Act and
Nova Scotia Act go on to clarify that the statute does not create
jurisdiction in other tribunals beyond these courts. 37
The Ontario Court (General Division) in Belay v. Saskatchewan
Government Insurance38 was of the view that a similar jurisdiction
provision of the Saskatchewan Automobile Accident Insurance Act39 was
intended only to exclude the jurisdiction of inferior courts. According to
the Court:
the historical purpose of this section has been to designate which court in Saskatchewan
has been given jurisdiction to adjudicate Part III claims .... The section does not purport
to address the issue of the jurisdiction of any court outside Saskatchewan, nor does it say
that any action to enforce Part III rights may only be brought in Saskatchewan, that is, to
oust what could, in certain circumstances, otherwise be the jurisdiction of any other
provincial superior court. Not only would clear and explicit language be required to
convey any such legislative intent, but any such language would of course have to
withstand constitutional scrutiny, as provincial Legislatures are presumed to intend to
legislate intra-territorially: Moran v. Pyle National (Canada).40
It is possible that the jurisdiction provisions in the Crown
Proceedings Acts were intended to exclude the jurisdiction of foreign
courts in order to clarify that the legislation was not intended to
undermine any sovereign immunity that the Crown might wish to claim
in a foreign court; and it is possible that the potential effect of
36 Section 10 of the Saskatchewan Act, supra note 23, provides: "[s]ubject to this Act and to
any enactment limiting the jurisdiction of the District Court, any proceedings against the Crown
may be instituted in the District Court and proceeded with in accordance with The District Court
Act," and see the former provisions of the Alberta legislation, supra note 27.
37 Section 9 of the New Brunswick Act, supra note 23, provides: "[n]othing in this Act
authorizes proceedings against the Crown in an inferior court;" and section 10 of the Nova Scotia
Act, supra note 23, provides: "[n]othing in this Act authorizes proceedings against the Crown except
in the Supreme Court or a county court."
38 (1992), 10 O.R. (3d) 371.
3 9 R.S.S. 1978, c. A-35.
4 0 Supra note 38 at 374-76 [emphasis in original].
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precluding suit in the superior courts of another province was simply not
considered by provincial legislators. Nevertheless, it appears that for at
least seven of the ten provinces there is neither a common law nor a
statutory basis for jurisdiction of other provincial superior courts over
their Crowns. Following the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in
Morguard4 l and Hunt,4 2 however, it is now recognized that the
Constitution may itself provide a source of court jurisdiction by
prohibiting the ouster of the jurisdiction of the superior courts of a
province with a real and substantial connection to the matter.
IV. JURISDICTION OVER CROWN PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO THE CONSTITUTION
The law regarding the jurisdictional relationships between the
Canadian provincial superior courts has undergone significant
development following the 1990 Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Morguard. In that case a provincial superior court was held to have
jurisdiction to issue an enforceable default judgment .against a defendant
served in another province because there was a "real and substantial
connection" between the matter and the province in which the judgment
was issued. Although the question of jurisdiction had arisen in the
context of the enforcement of extra-provincial judgments, La Forest J.,
speaking for the Court, held that "the taking of jurisdiction by a court in
one province and its recognition in another must be viewed as
correlatives." 43 In describing the special relationship that exists between
the Canadian superior courts as a result of Canada's particular
constitutional structure, La Forest J. emphasized that it gave rise to
special requirements for rules of court jurisdiction. In his words:
[T]here is really no comparison between the interprovincial relationships of today and
those obtaining between foreign countries in the 19th century ... and the courts made a
serious error in transposing the rules developed for the enforcement of foreign judgments
to the enforcement ofjudgments from sister-provinces. ... The considerations underlying
the rules of comity apply with much greater force between the units of a federal state ...
It seems anarchic and unfair that a person should be able to avoid legal obligations
arising in one province simply by moving to another province. Why should a plaintiff be
compelled to begin an action in the province where the defendant now resides, whatever
41 Supra note 2 at 1095.
4 2 Supra note 1.
43 Supra note 2 at 1103, and see 1094.
19971
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the inconvenience and costs this may bring, and whatever the degree of connection the
relevant transaction may have with another province?44
In formulating the appropriate rule for jurisdiction among the Canadian
provincial superior courts, he said:
to what extent may a court of a province properly exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
in another province? A case in this Court, Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1
SCR 393 ... is instructive as to the manner in which a court may properly exercise
jurisdiction ... Dickson J. ... rejected any rigid or mechanical theory for determining the.
situs of the tort. Rather, he adopted "a more flexible, qualitative and quantitative test,"
posing the question, as had some English cases there cited, in terms of whether it was
"inherently reasonable" for the action to be brought in a particular jurisdiction ... the
approach of permitting suit where there is a real and substantial connection with the
action provides a reasonable balance between the rights of the parties.45
In Hunt, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of provincial
legislation that affected the exercise of jurisdiction by other provincial
superior courts. Orders had been issued by a Quebec court pursuant to
the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act 46 to prohibit the Quebec
defendant from forwarding productions from Quebec to British
Columbia for the purposes of proceedings commenced in British
Columbia. The plaintiffs argued that the Quebec legislation, enacted to
protect Canadian defendants from the excesses of American antitrust
litigation, was constitutionally inapplicable to proceedings in another
Canadian province. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed, in part,
because a plaintiff should not be compelled to begin actions in the
province where the defendant resides regardless of the connection the
action may have to another province.
While the Court had considered the inappropriateness of unduly
restricting superior court jurisdiction to the courts of one province both
in Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd.47 and in Morguard, this was the
first time the Court had reviewed the constitutionality of legislation
having this effect. The Court held that although Morguard was not
argued in constitutional terms, its principles were constitutional
principles-they could not be overridden by provincial legislation.
While provinces were not "debarred from enacting legislation that may
have some effect on litigation in other provinces," this legislation "must
44 1bid. at 1098, 1102-03.
45Ibid. at 1104-08.
46 R.S.Q. c. D-12.
47 [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393.
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respect minimum standards of order and fairness." 48 The failure of
provincial legislation to respect these minimum standards could render it
subject to constitutional review in any provincial superior court.
What was constitutionally infirm about the ruling under the
Quebec Business Concerns Records Act? By thwarting the discovery
process in the courts of other provinces, the Act effectively required the
plaintiff to commence litigation in a Quebec court. The Act operated to
arrogate to the Quebec courts exclusive jurisdiction over matters that
might appropriately be tried in the courts of other provinces by reason of
the real and substantial connections that the matters had to those
provinces. By ousting the jurisdiction of a Canadian court in another
province with a real and substantial connection to the matter, orders
made under the Act offended the principles of order and fairness
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morguard. As La Forest J.
explained:
The essential effect, then, and indeed the barely shielded intent, [of blocking statutes,
such as the Business Concerns Records Act] is to impede the substantive rights of litigants
elsewhere. It would force parties to conduct litigation in multiple fora and compel more
plaintiffs to choose to litigate in the courts of Ontario and Quebec. Other provinces
could, of course, follow suit. It is inconceivable that in devising a scheme of union
comprising a common market stretching from sea to sea, the Fathers of Confederation
would have contemplated a situation where citizens would be effectively deprived of
access to the ordinary courts in their jurisdiction in respect of transactions flowing from
the existence of that market.49
Applying this reasoning to the question of the jurisdiction a
provincial superior court has over the Crown in right of other provinces,
it could be said that having made their Crown subject to proceedings in
the local superior courts, it would be ultra vires the authority of the
provincial legislatures to confine proceedings against their Crowns to the
courts of their province. Legislation having this effect would preclude
suit in the superior court of another province to which the matter had a
real and substantial connection 0 In Hunt this resulted in a ruling that
the impugned legislation was constitutionally inapplicable to litigation in
4 8 Hunt, supra note 1 at 324.
49 Ibid. at 330.
50 On one ancillary logistical point, the objection that a suit against another province's Crown
would entail the inconvenience of the attorney general of that province travelling to appear in the
litigation seems to have been answered by the rejection in Hunt of this as a ground for precluding
court jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of another province's legislation.
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Canada.S1 In the same way, then, it would appear that the jurisdictional
provisions of the provincial legislation for proceedings against the Crown
must be read to include the superior courts of any province with a real
and substantial connection to the matter.
V. REAL AND SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION
Although legislation for proceedings against the Crown may not
oust the jurisdiction of the superior court of another province with a real
and substantial connection to the matter, the jurisdiction of that court
would still depend on the existence of a real and substantial connection
to the matter. In a case in which the provincial Crowns had acted jointly
to incur liability in every province there would appear to be a real and
substantial connection between the matter and the courts of any of the
provinces. However, in a case in which the same liability was incurred
independently by each government in each province it would remain to
be determined whether the matter could be said to have a real and
substantial connection to a single province.
The precise nature of the requisite "real and substantial"
connection necessary to satisfy the jurisdictional test established in
Morguard and Hunt has not been authoritatively defined. Whether it is a
connection between the province of the forum and the cause of action,
or the litigants, or the practical requirements of the litigation (for
example, the accessibility of witnesses and evidence) and the province
has not been fixed. Indeed, La Forest J. noted in Hunt that "[t]he exact
limits of what constitutes a reasonable assumption of jurisdiction were
not defined, and I add that no test can perhaps ever be rigidly applied."5 2
It appears, however, that even in a case involving liability incurred in a
province by the Crown in right of that province, the practical
requirements of the litigation might provide a real and substantial
connection to another province.
Early recognition of the possibility that the appropriate forum
might be determined by the practical requirements of the litigation may
be found in the House of Lords decision in Spiliada Maritime Corp. v.
Cansulex Ltd..S3 In that case, the Court endorsed the trial judge's
Si The Court held that it was not necessary to consider whether it could properly be "read
down" to permit its application to jurisdictions outside the country, presumably, because the
application to foreign litigation was not in issue.
52 Hunt, supra note 1 at 324.
53 [1987] A.C. 460.
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finding that, notwithstanding the strong connection to British Columbia,
the matter should be tried in the English court because another difficult
and complex case with very similar factual and legal issues had just been
tried in that court. This was described as "the Cambridgeshire factor"
following the name of the ship in the previous case. According to the
court at first instance:
The plaintiff's solicitors have made all the dispositions and incurred all the expense for
the trial of one action in England; they have engaged English counsel and educated them
in the various topics upon which expert evidence will be called; they have engaged
English expert witnesses; and they have assembled vast numbers of documents. They
have also, no doubt, educated themselves upon the issues in the action. All that has been
done on behalf of Cansulex as well, save that one of their expert witnesses is Canadian. If
they now wish to start the process again in Canada, that is their choice. But it seems to
me that the additional inconvenience and expense which would be thrust upon the
plaintiffs if this action were tried in Canada far outweighs the burden which would fall
upon Cansulex if they had to bring their witnesses and senior executives here a second
time. Overall it would be wasteful in the extreme of talent, effort and money if the
parties to this case were to have to start again in Canada.54
Having reviewed the various arguments for and against a stay based on
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Lord Goff returned to the
Cambridgeshire factor and concluded:
I believe that anyone who has been involved, as counsel, in very heavy litigation of this
kind, with a number of experts on both sides and difficult scientific questions involved,
knows only too well what the learning curve is like; how much information and
knowledge has to be, and is, absorbed, not only by the lawyers but really by the whole
team, including both lawyers and experts, as they learn about the interrelation of law, fact
and scientific knowledge, having regard to the contentions advanced by both sides in the
case, and identify in their minds the crucial matters on which attention has to be focused,
why these are the crucial matters, and how they are to be assessed. The judge in the
present case has considerable experience of litigation of this kind, and is well aware of
what is involved. He was, in my judgment, entitled to take the view (as he did) that this
matter was not merely of advantage to the shipowners, but also constituted an advantage
which was not balanced by a countervailing equal disadvantage to Cansulex; and (more
pertinently) further to take the view that having experienced teams of lawyers and experts
available on both sides of the litigation, who had prepared for and fought a substantial
part of the Cambridgeshire action for Cansulex (among others) on one side and the
relevant owners on the other, would contribute to efficiency, expedition and
economy-and he could have added, in my opinion, both to assisting the court to reach a
just resolution, and to promoting a possibility of settlement, in the present case. This is
not simply a matter, as Oliver L.J. suggested, of financial advantage to the shipowners; it
is a matter which can, and should, properly be taken into account, in a case of this kind,
in the objective interests of justice.5 5
54 Ibid. at 470-71.
55 Ibid. at 485-86.
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Thus, litigation convenience and judicial economy may be
significant factors in establishing a real and substantial connection to the
forum. In a matter involving common factual and legal issues arising
from liability incurred by each of the provincial Crowns in their own
provinces, the convenience and economy of litigating in a single forum
could render it the appropriate forum for the resolution of the claims
against several of the provincial Crowns.
In addition, the benefits of consolidating matters to avoid the
potential for multiplicity of actions and inconsistent results is coming to
be recognized as a factor supporting jurisdiction in a single court where
a claim might otherwise need to be tried in the courts of several
provinces. The courts of Ontario and British Columbia have
acknowledged the importance of consolidating claims by certifying class
proceedings that span provincial borders. For example, in Nantais v.
Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd.,56 the Ontario Court (General
Division) certified a nationwide plaintiff class in an action for damages
from allegedly defective pacemakers. In doing so, the court observed
that it seemed "eminently sensible, for all the reasons given by La Forest
J. in Morguard, and the policy reasons given for passage of the [Class
Proceedings] Act, to have the questions of liability of these defendants
determined as far as possible once and for all, for all Canadians."5 7
The British Columbia Supreme Court took a similar approach in
certifying a multi-province class action for injuries associated with breast
implants in Harrington v. Dow Coming Corporation.5 8 The court
reviewed the practical considerations affecting the product liability claim
before it which potentially involved plaintiffs and defendants from
several provinces. Referring to comments in the Supreme Court of
Canada decision inAmchem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers'
Compensation Board)59 regarding the difficulty of identifying a single
appropriate forum in cases involving large plaintiff classes and multiple
defendants, the court said:
I think those comments are pertinent here, and they go to the jurisdictional issue and not
just to forum conveniens. The demands of multi-claimant manufacturer's liability
litigation require recognition of concurrent jurisdiction of courts within Canada. In such
cases there is no utility in having the same factual issues litigated in several jurisdictions if
the claims can be consolidated .... [In] claims inside and outside the province which raise
56 (1995), 25 O.R. (3d) 331.
5 7 1bid. at 347.
58 (1997), 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 88 [hereinafter Harrington].
59 [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897.
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the same common issue, [i]t is that common issue which establishes the real and
substantial connection necessary for jurisdiction. ' 60
On this basis, even if the liability of each provincial Crown is
incurred in its own province, a claim involving the same factual and legal
issues would, by virtue of those common factual and legal issues, have a
real and substantial connection to any of the provinces involved, thereby
establishing jurisdiction in that province's superior courts.
It is possible that the court would have to apply different laws to
claims arising in the various provinces if the law differed from province
to province and if liability had been incurred by each Crown in its
province.6 1 The court in Harrington6 2 recognized that, in taking
jurisdiction over claims arising in other provinces, it might be required to
apply the limitations and other substantive law of those provinces. 63
Still, it was "not persuaded that the differences between British
Columbia and other jurisdictions in the context of this litigation are
sufficiently problematic that the general view expressed in Nantais
should be rejected on practical grounds." 64 Accordingly, whether the
need to apply the laws of different provinces to various sub-classes
should prevent a single court from assuming jurisdiction to try the
matter would likely depend on whether the application of different laws
would defeat the litigation convenience and judicial economy achieved
by consolidating the claims into one proceeding.
VI. CONCLUSION
In proceedings against several provincial Crowns for liability
jointly incurred there could be a real and substantial connection to any
of those provinces supporting the jurisdiction of their courts. Further,
proceedings against various provincial Crowns for several liability that
involve common factual and legal issues, could afford litigation
convenience and judicial economy that would support the exercise of
jurisdiction by one court over the various Crowns impleaded; and the
common factual or legal issues could supply the real and substantial
connection necessary for the proper assumption of jurisdiction. The
60 Supra note 58 at 95.
61 Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022.
62 Supra note 58.
63 Ibid at 91.
64 Ibid at 94.
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interest in avoiding inconsistent results could provide further support for
the consolidation of the claims in a single forum.
Should this result be secured through federal legislation? In
both Morguard and Hunt, the Court hinted at the permissibility of
federal legislation pursuant to the Peace, Order, and Good Government
clause 65 which "gives the federal Parliament powers to deal with
interprovincial activities." 6 6 The question of interprovincial Crown
immunity would appear to be one of national importance beyond the
competence of provincial legislation and, thereby, permissibly regulated
under the national concerns doctrine interpreting the Peace, Order, and
Good Government clause. However, it is not clear that such legislation
would be needed. As with the issues in Morguard and Hunt, the
amenability of the provincial Crowns to the jurisdiction of other
provincial superior courts is a relatively discrete and straightforward
issue that could be clarified by an authoritative judicial pronouncement
regarding the proper interpretation of Crown proceedings legislation. It
would not appear to require legislation in the way that a complex
regulatory scheme might require a statutory framework to set out the
relationship between various provisions. Moreover, because the current
provincial legislation has largely been adopted from a model act, there is
little need for federal legislation to establish common rules. Rather,
general principles of civil litigation and the conflict of laws would
probably suffice to resolve issues arising as to the scope or applicability
of the basic principle that the Crown of one province was subject to the
jurisdiction of the superior court of another province.
The notion that the Canadian provinces are "sovereign" vis-A-vis
one another as this relates to court jurisdiction appears, then, to have
been a passing view, applied with little critical consideration of the
differences between int6rprovincial and foreign relations, and now
overtaken by recent developments in the law of interprovincial comity in
court jurisdiction. The increasing demands for litigation convenience
and judicial economy, especially as witnessed in the advent of multi-
province class proceedings, promise to provide a strong practical
impetus to overcome the barriers to consolidating claims arising in the
distribution of products and services throughout Canada. As was
observed in Hunt:
65 Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 25, s. 91.
66 Hunt, supra note 1 at 322, citing interprovincial Co-Operatives Ltd. v. The Queen, [1976] 1
S.C.R. 477; R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, La Forest J. (dissenting but not
on this point); and MultipleAccess v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161.
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It is inconceivable that in devising a scheme of union comprising a common market
stretching from sea to sea, the Fathers of Confederation would have contemplated a
situation where citizens would be effectively deprived of access to the ordinary courts in
their jurisdiction in respect of transactions flowing from the existence of that common
market 67
Indeed, this accords with the widely held intuition that the
relationship between the legal systems in Canada should reflect "the
essentially unitary structure of our judicial system" 6 8-a distinctive
characteristic of the Canadian federation. Thus, coupled with the
admonitions of the Supreme Court of Canada to reassess traditional
conflicts rules in light of the principles of our constitutional law, the
need to revisit the doctrine of interprovincial sovereign immunity is
likely to be among the ongoing opportunities for re-examining the
nature of our federation through the operation of the Canadian court
system.
6 7 Supra note 1 at 322.
68 IbikL at 330.
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